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CRM is Dead 
FORUM 
CRM IS DEAD 
Cass Howell 
CRM is dead, at least in the U.S. No one killed it; it just passed on fiom natural causes, exacerbated by the 
evolution of the aviation industry, society and world politics. It was wonderfully useful in its heyday, and we as 
aviation professionals all owe a debt of gratitude to those responsible for its creation and implementation. They 
were truly visionaries. 
So what happened to Crew Resource 
Management? Many things, both good and bad, but about 
a halfdozen factors combined to cause its demise. The 
first and perhaps most powehl influence on CRM was 
the consequences of the naturai lifespan of many, if not 
all, business, education and social movements. A review 
of history will demonstrate that many movements have a 
natural liiespan of about twenty years, plus or minus five. 
Examples of this abound and include the Temperance and 
the Civil Rights eras, the quality improvement push in the 
automobile industry (anyone remember Total Quality 
Management?), any number of psychological therapies 
(psychoanalysis, behavior modification, humanistic 
theory, etc.). If the movement was not well grounded in 
fact or in demonstrated value the cycle (birth to death) 
could be much shorter. So it should not surprise us that 
CRM has reached the end of its life-cycle; indeed, we 
should expect it.' 
Having said this, it should be recognized that the 
single most influential event in accelerating the end of 
CRM was the attacks of September 1 1, 2001. These 
attacks, as everyone knows, were catastrophic to U.S. 
airlines in a number of ways. The most important to 
CRM was the immediate financial crisis that ensued in the 
airline industry. One after the other, almost all of the 
major caniers either went into bankruptcy or to the brink 
Even our wars seem to be on a similar generational 
cycle, beginning with the Spanish-American War to 
World War I (19 years), World War I to World War II (23 
years), World War I1 to the Vietnam War (20 years), 
Vietnam War to Desert Storm (1 7 years). Only the 
Korean War does not fit that interval sequence. Since 
Desert Storm we seem to have entered a state of more or 
less continuous warfare. 
of it. This financial crisis cut the legs fiom CRM, 
eviscerating it as management sought ways to draw down 
on training and all other costs. When airline is taking 
those little passenger pillows of its aircraft in order to 
reduce weight, and thus fuel expense, it is difficult to 
rationalize spending twenty million dollars annually on 
CRM training. When personal retirement accounts are 
reduced to pennies on the dollar so that the carrier can 
stay in business a little longer, there is immense pressure 
to find ways to do everything, including CRM, vastly 
cheaper, just barely enough to meet the letter of the law. 
Although all company representatives will insist, "We 
would never do anything to compromise safety," it is very 
difficult to believe that watching a training DVD on a 
computer for a few hours will equally supplant 2-3 days 
of personalized live instruction fiom experienced line 
crewmembers. While all carriers have not gotten to this 
dismal point, it is quite clearly where things are headed. 
To some extent CRM has been a victim of its 
own success. The imperious Captain of old, whom 1 * and 
2" officers more feared than respected, has largely been 
supplanted by a generation who have never known 
anything other than a crew-concept flying team, thus the 
driving force for the establishment of CRM has largely 
faded. The Captain's once unquestioned (literally) 
authority, argue many, has been further eroded by greater 
decision making latitude on the part of ATC, dispatchers, 
and even gate agents. Add to this more oversight in the 
form of coclcpit voice and data recorders and FOQA, and 
now the Captain's throne is not so grand. Even 
automation often serves to place the Captain in the role of 
just confirming the FMC's recommendation, rather than 
making original decisions. Indeed, in Airbus aircraft the 
Captain (and others) is actively precluded h m  some 
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actions. All of this, in combination, reduces the power- 
distance relationship that CRM sought to bridge, thus 
lessening its perceived need. 
In addition to this egalitarian trend, CRM has 
lost much of its visibility. Not only has it been integrated 
anonymously into regular training, but the giants of the 
CRM movement, such as Lauber, Helmreich, Wiener, and 
Foushee have mostly retired or moved on to other 
research areas. Where is the next generation of advocates 
(zealots?) who will champion the progress of CRM? Is 
there anyone under age 60 who is a big name in the field? 
This lack of institutional and practitioner energy 
is reflected in the dearth of active research and publication 
in the field, including FAA and NASA funding for such. 
It is equally apparent by the lack of forums that actively 
focus on and promote CRM. In a survey of over 100 
aviation or academic research related conferences 
scheduled as of this writing, only one (Embry-Riddle's 
CRM Vectors Conference) included CRM in the title. 
While everyone recognizes that the application of good 
Human Factors techniques are still needed, the trend is to 
devote money and effort towards alternate programs, for 
example the Global War on E m r  initiative, at the expense 
of CRM. This is in keeping with the aforementioned 
lifecycle concept, whereby movements are usually 
supplanted by "the latest and greatest," solution 
(hopefully) to age old problems. 
Interestingly, Europe in particular and the rest of 
the world in general have been much less affected by 
these trends. To some degree this is because they got a 
later start, and thus the lifecycle is at the near end; another 
h r  is that foreign carriers were not as devastated by the 
9-1 1 aftermath as were U.S. airlines, thus CRM research 
and implementation continue to progress. As a result, in 
other locations CRM as a safety program has actually 
advanced beyond where it stagnated in the United States. 
Also, CRM variants in the nuclear, medical and other 
o&hoot fields continue to evolve in a positive direction 
for the same reasons. 
None of the aforementioned points is intended to 
lessen or undermine the contributions of CRM and its 
practioners to aviation safety. It succeeded because it was 
effective, timely and achievable. Let's hope its 
replacement is even more so..) 
Cass Howell is a professor of aeronautical science and department chair at the Daytona Beach campus of Embry-Riddle 
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